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OREGON
Kerivan v. Water Res. Comm'n, 72 P.3d 659 (Or. Ct. App. 2003)
(holding Water Resources Department was not required to initiate
forfeiture proceedings where the underlying water rights had already
been cancelled in connection with transfers from irrigation to
instream use).
In September 1999, the Kerivans requested Oregon Water
Resources
Department
("Department")
to initiate forfeiture
proceedings to cancel various senior water rights in Sucker Creek. In
their request, the Kerivans claimed the owners of the rights forfeited
the rights due to nonuse for five years. In Department proceedings
with notice and without protest, the Department refused to cancel the
water rights, stating that previous transfers from irrigation to instream
use cancelled the rights. The Department found the portion of an
originating water right changed by a transfer order is not subject to
forfeiture once the order's appeal period expires. The Kerivans then
filed a petition for judicial review in the Josephine County Circuit
Court and requested a declaration that the Department was required
to conduct cancellation proceedings. The Department moved to
dismiss for lack ofjurisdiction and failure to state a claim. The circuit
court dismissed the petition and complaint and entered judgment for
the Department. The Kerivans appealed the judgment to the Oregon
Court of Appeals.
On appeal, the Kerivans first argued that the circuit court erred in
dismissing their declaratory judgment complaint. The court held that
section 183.490 of the Oregon Statutes, which provides that a court
may compel an agency to act where it unlawfully has refused to make a
decision, provided the exclusive mechanism to review the
Department's refusal to act. Therefore, the circuit court properly
found it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to provide declaratory relief.
Next, the court addressed the Kerivans' petition for judicial review.
The Kerivans argued that the Oregon statutes require the Department
initiate cancellation proceedings "whenever it appears that a right has
been forfeited." Specifically, the Kerivans claimed (1) the transfer
orders did not justify refusal to consider evidence of nonuse prior to
the date of transfer, and (2) failure to challenge the transfers did not
preclude their ability to request forfeiture proceedings where the
transfers did not injure their rights. The Department argued the
Kerivans were obligated to challenge the transfers when pending
because the transfers required consideration of cancellation for
nonuse, and since the Department published notice, the Kerivans'
claim constituted an untimely collateral attack on the transfer orders.
Interpreting the transfer statutes, the court found that whether a
right is forfeited may be an issue in transfer proceedings and the
Kerivans could have protested on that basis, allowing the Kerivans to
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raise the forfeiture issue in the transfer proceedings. The court then
examined whether the Kerivans' failure to protest the transfers
precluded them from requesting the Department to initiate the
forfeiture proceedings. The Kerivans argued the transfer orders did
not affect their ability to seek forfeiture, claiming (1) the statute
provides "whenever" a right appears forfeited, the Department shall
initiate cancellation proceedings; and (2) the transfer application
must show either water was used or is not subject to cancellation.
Ultimately, the court held the transfer orders were "conclusive
evidence of the priority and extent of the appropriation therein," and
therefore the Department was not obligated to initiate forfeiture
proceedings. Thus, the court upheld the circuit court's judgment
dismissing the Kerivans' petition for judicial review and declaratory
relief complaint.
JaredB. Briant

Owen v. Div. of State Lands, 76 P.3d 158 (Or. Ct. App. 2003) (holding
that depositing fill material on the existing footprint of a submerged
farm road to raise it above water level is "farm road maintenance"
under Oregon state law).
In 1987, Owen, through the nonprofit Redding Foundation, Inc.
("Redding"), purchased property zoned for exclusive farm use in
hopes of protecting wetlands on the property. A road through the
marsh provided the only access to the non-wetland portion of the
property. The road, approximately 500 feet long, existed since 1978.
Owen used the road several times a year and maintained it so that it
was passable to four-wheel drive vehicles. In late 1999 or early 2000,
part of the road became permanently submerged due to a silt
constriction in the Williamson River. Owen hired a contractor to raise
the roadbed above the water level by adding some 2600 cubic yards of
fill material.
On October 20, 2000, the Division of State Lands ("DSL") issued a
cease and desist order, directing Owen to stop fill activities on the
portion of the road that crossed the marsh on his property. DSL held
a hearing on April 3, 2001. On October 16, 2001, DSL issued its final
order, which adopted the findings of the hearing officer and
concluded that no permit exemption applied. Owen sought judicial
review of the DSL final order. Owen argued the fill was exempt from
permit requirements under Oregon law, which allowed maintenance
of farm roads as long as the maintenance did not significantly and
adversely affect wetlands. DSL argued the wetland statute controlled
and only exempted emergency reconstruction of "recently damaged
parts of currently serviceable roads," and because the road was
submerged, it was not currently serviceable, thus excluding permit
exemption.
The Oregon Court of Appeals first considered the meaning of the

